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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

CONSTRUCTION OF A WILL AFTER A
FINAL DECREE IN COUNTY COURT AT TIME
OF SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE*
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN CIRCUIT COURT FOR
LINCOLN COUNTY
ELISE MATHILE KLEE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Vs.
WILLIAM BROWNGARDT,

OPINION

Defendant.

This action is brought to construe the will of George Martin
Duering (if the same is' now open to construction) and hereby
determine the nature and extent of the interests of the parties to
this action in certain real estate left by said Duering at his death,
and thereupon after the interests of all parties in the real estate
described in the complaint shall have been ascertained and determined to partition the said real estate.
There seems to be no contested questions for the court to determine other than two:
First: Is the will of George Martin Duering now open to construction, or must the final decree in the County Court at the
time of the settlement of the estate of George Martin Duering,
govern?
Second: If open to construction, what is nor the proper construction of said will?
I am satisfied that the final decree rendered by the County
Court in the George Martin Duering estate, by which the court
undertook to assign the real estate to the widow absolutely and
free of all claims of any other persons is only presumptive evidence of the widow's right to said real estate so assigned.
It appears that none of the heirs or legatees or devisees of
*Thig able opinion was submitted by Mr. G. M. Sheldon of the Tomahawk Bar, in reply to Professor Lang's article "The Finality of Decrees of
the County Court of Wisconsin," which appeared in the June issue, 92
Vol. 6, Marquette Law Rev. 159. Professor Lang contends that such
decrees are final as against collateral attack, Barker v. Barker, 14 Wis 131,
and against direct attack after the longest statutory period (one year) for
allowance of appeals therefrom has elapsed, See. 4035, R. S. 1g92; except
where sucli decree was obtained by fraud upon the court. Staab Will Case,
i66 Wis. 5 7.--Ed.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

George Martin Duering entered any appearance in the settlement
of his estate, excepting the widow, Barbara Duering, and that no
notices were given personally to any persons, and that the only
notice of the proceedings taken in such settlement was the usual
notice of application for probate of will, notice to creditors, and
notice of application for final settlement of accounts, all of which
notices were published according to statute.
It seems clear that when a will is propounded for probate, and
notice to all persons interested shall have been given, as provided
by statute, the County Court acquires jurisdiction to probate the
will and to assume charge of the estate for its administration.
The devisees under the will take by force of the will, and their
rights are determined by it. When a will is probated and a certified copy thereof recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds,
title to the real estate described in it passes to the devisee in accordance with its terms, subject only to the rights of creditors
and costs of construction. Sec. 2294-2296 Stat.
When administration of an estate is completed by the executor
or administrator, and the debt shall have been ascertained and
paid and the personal property reduced to possession, such executor or administrator must account to the court for all of the
personal estate which shall have come to his hands. Such executor or administrator has no title to or authority over the real
estate except insofar as it may be necessary for the settlement
of the estate and payments of debts, and except as by specific
provisions of will an executor is given some other power. Chapter 168 Statutes.
It is then provided that "Before the administration account of
any executor or administrator shall be allowed, notice shall be
given to all persons interested, and the time and place of allowing and examining the same." Here follow provisions as to
notices (Sec. 3931).

These final proceedings in settlement in no wise refer to real
estate. No notice is required to be given to any heir or devisee
that at the final settlement of accounts any question will be taken
up respecting the construction of a will, or any action taken that
might settle, adjust, or cut off the rights of any person claiming
*underthe will. If at any stage in the proceedings the proper construction of a will which has been admitted to probate comes into
question, the statute provides for a definite proceeding to determine such construction. (Sec. 379ia).
150
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A petition must be filed, and the court directs the giving of
such notice to all persons interested as shall insure, so far as
practicable, a day in court for every such person and a reasonable opportunity to be heard. It rather plainly appears that exclusive of that proceedings the County Court is not expected or
presumed to pass upon the proper construction of a will.
When it comes to final settlement of the executors or administrators accounts the statute provides that the County Court shall
by a judgment, assign the residue of the estate, if any, to such
persons as by law are entitled to the same. This statute is found
in the chapter relating to distribution of the personal estate after
settlement of the accounts of the personal representative. Undoubtedly it is conclusive, unless appealed from, as to all personal
estates assigned.
The statute then provides that, "Any finding or determination
as to heirship or assignment of real estate in any such judgment
shall be presumptive evidence of any fact so found, and of the
right to the portion of any estate so assigned, and shall be conclusive evidence thereof as to all persons appearing in any such
proceeding, and as to all persons claiming under them." (Sec.
3940, subd. 3.)
This statute very plainly fits in with the spirit and intent of
the other statutes relative to administration of estates, and carries
into effect the principles that as to personal estate, heirs and
legatees take under the judgment of the County Court, whereas as
to real estate heirs and devisees take under the law or the will.
The amendment of Sec. 3940, made in I9o7, declaring the effect of the judgment therein provided for, appears to have been
enacted in order to make clear the rule which had previously
prevailed respecting the effect of such judgments. Ruth vs. OberBrunner,40 Wis. 236, 269; Van Matrie vs. Swank, 147 Wis. 93;

P-. vs. P-.

i8i N. W.

722-724;

McKenney vs. Minahan, li9

Wis. 651.
I conclude therefore that the question is open to now determine
what was the proper construction of the will of George Martin
Duering, and whether his real estate left by him at his death
was properly assigned by the County Court.
The will, so far as it is here in question, reads:
I give, devise and bequeath to my beloved wife, Barbara Duering, all of
my estate of whatever name, title or description, real, personal or mixed
to be hers to do with as she wishes; that is to say, that she may sell
151
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convey, mortgage or encumber any or all of it and uge it as she sees fit.
"At my wife's decease my property which may be then remaining which
belongs to her, real or personal, I give and devise in equal shares to
Louis Braungart of Sac Harbor, Long Island, State of New York, and
Johanna Glass, of Ostheim," etc.

This will must be construed according to Sec. 2278 of the
Statutes to give to Barbara Duering, the widow, all of the estate
which George Martin Duering had, "unless it shall clearly appear
by the will that the devisor intended to convey a less estate."
Does it clearly appear that the testator intended to give Barbara Duering less than an absolute estate in fee? Many cases
have been cited to and considered by the court on this question,
but since the language used in each will is always different from
that in any other will, no authorities are conclusive, and a discussion of them would be of little value. Those most nearly in
point appear to be: Will of Brooks, 167 Wis. 75; Will of Olson,
i65 Wis. 4o9; Knox vs. Knox, 59 Wis. 172; Jones vs. Jones, 66
Wis. 310; Colin vs. Soswards, i29 Wis. 320; Tabor vs. Tabor, 85

Wis. 313; Jones vs. Roberts, 84 Wis. 465; Derse vs. Derse, io3
Wis. 113.

Attention must be given to the very words of the will under
consideration. The devise to Barbara Duering of all testator's
property was stated to make the property "hers to do with as
she wishes." This is followed by a videlicet which explains, defines, and limits the terms previously used, and its meaning is
stated to be, "that she may sell, convey, mortgage, or encumber
any or all of it and use it as she sees fit." Thus it is clear that it
gives to her a free hand to convert the property into other forms
than that in which she receives it. "and to use it as she sees fit."
This gives her a right to consume so much of it as she may desire,
but the language used cannot be construed to mean any right to
give away or devise, or bequeath the property she receives under
her will. She may use it. She may transform it. She may consume it. She may get from it any beneficial interest which she
can, but she is not given the right to otherwise dispose of it.
The devise to the widow is followed with a provision that at
her decease any property that may then be remaining, which belongs to her, real or personal, I give and devise in equal shares
to Louis Braungart . .

.

. and Johanna Glass . ..."

These are not precatory words. They are words of devise and
bequest. They are apt words to vest an interest.
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It is very clear that from the language used that the testator
intended to himself devise and bequeath to Louis Braungart and
Johanna Glass the residue of his property remaining at the death
of his widow, and that he intended to give his wife only a life
estate coupled with power to transform the property into different forms and the right to use of it for her own needs.
I am entirely satisfied that under this will all of the estate of
George Martin Duering remaining in the hands of his widow at
the time of her death passed by force and effect of his will to
Louis Braungart and Johanna Glass.
The foregoing, I believe, disposes of all contested questions.
The interests of the parties in the various parcels of real estate
herein involved will be determined in accordance herewith and
in accordance with the laws of descent.
It appears because of the multiplicity of the parties and the
varieties of their interests in the several parcels of real estate
involved, that it would not be practicable to partition the real
estate without sale. There will, therefore, be an order directing
the sale of the premises according to statute.
Dated July ii, 1921.
A. H; REm; Judge.

